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ABSTRACT
In a ﬁve-to-four decision announced in February of 2020, the
United States Supreme Court ruled that the parents of an unarmed
ﬁfteen-year-old Mexican national killed by a U.S. Border Patrol agent
in a cross-border shooting, cannot sue for damages in U.S. civil
court. Here, we critique the majority and dissenting opinions and attempt to reconcile the strikingly different approach each used to
resolve the case. Using a publicly available data set, we examine
the homicide in Hernández v. Mesa, against the circumstances and
context in which underage youth were killed by police within the
United States over a ﬁve year period before, during and after the
death of Michael Brown. The circumstances of the 121 cases suggest a greater need for police accountability if the justice system is
to remain true to the protective “child saving” ideology that launched
the founding of the juvenile court.
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 25, 2020, in a ﬁve-to-four decision, the United States
Supreme Court decided that the family of a ﬁfteen-year-old Mexican
national who was shot by a U.S. Border Patrol agent would not be
allowed to sue for damages.1 At the time of his death, Sergio Adrián
Hernández Güereca was unarmed and on the Mexico side of the
U.S./Mexico border. A grainy video2 shows Border Patrol Agent Jesus
Mesa, Jr., point a gun at Sergio3 as he is running away, crossing
back into Mexico from the United States, over a concrete culvert
separating the two countries.4 On ﬁlm, Agent Mesa approaches on a
bicycle on the U.S. side of the border; apprehends one of Sergio’s
friends; then ﬁres his weapon twice in Sergio’s direction as the teen
1

Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 206 L. Ed. 2d 29 (2020).

2

Grosscrime2, Video Shows Border Shooting Scene, YOUTUBE (Jun. 10, 2010),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oa2LjgL40KE.
3

In his work, sociologist Victor Rios shows that juveniles of color are often
seen as more mature, more criminal, and less innocent than their White
counterparts. See VICTOR RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK AND LATINO BOYS
(2011); VICTOR RIOS, HUMAN TARGETS: SCHOOLS, POLICE, AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF LATINO
YOUTH (2017) [hereinafter “RIOS, HUMAN TARGETS”]. Accordingly, except when directly
quoting from a court opinion, we will refer to the victim by his ﬁrst name in this
article. In our view, this serves to humanize rather than objectify Sergio, reﬂects his
youthful status, and afﬁrms his innocence. See also, e.g., Phillip Atiba Goff, Matthew
Christian Jackson, Brook Allison Lewis Di Leone, Carmen Marie Culotta, & Natalie
Ann DiTomasso, The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing Black
Children, 106 INTERPERS. REL. & GROUP PROCESSES 526 (2014).
4

The culvert is not a wall, fence, or raised separation. The opinion notes that,
“[t]he border runs through the center of the culvert, which was designed to hold the
waters of the Rio Grande River but is now largely dry.” Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at
740.
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ﬂees toward the Mexican border.5 Accounts indicate that one bullet
struck Sergio in the face, causing his death.6 The killing occurred on
June 7, 2010.7
The incident was investigated by the U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ), which in April of 2012, concluded that Agent Mesa had not
violated any Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) policies or training.8
Consequently, no criminal charges were brought against Agent Mesa
by the federal government.9 Moreover, the United States denied a
request from Mexico that Mesa be extradited there to face charges
in its criminal courts.10 Sergio’s parents brought suit in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Texas seeking damages, alleging that Mesa violated Sergio’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment
rights. The District Court granted a motion to dismiss that was ﬁled
on behalf of Agent Mesa.11 The dismissal was afﬁrmed twice by the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.12
Sergio’s parents had ﬁled the suit under authority of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s 1971 ruling in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal
Narcotics Agents,13 which held that the victim of an unlawful arrest
and search could bring a Fourth Amendment claim for damages
against the agents who engaged in the conduct, even in the absence
of a federal statute authorizing such a claim.14 In Hernández v. Mesa,
the majority opinion acknowledges that Bivens actions have also
5

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 740.

6

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 754 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

7

Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Federal Ofﬁcials Close Investigation into the
Death of Sergio Hernández Güereca (Apr. 27, 2012) [hereinafter “DOJ, Press
Release”], https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-ofﬁcials-close-investigation-death-s
ergio-hernandez-guereca.
8

See DOJ Press Release, supra note 7. This conclusion, however, is difﬁcult
to reconcile with the general guidelines of the agency’s Handbook since Sergio was
unarmed, retreating from the agent, and was not involved in a recognizable crime.
See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., USE OF FORCE POLICY, GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES
HANDBOOK (2014) [hereinafter “CBP, USE OF FORCE POLICY”], https://www.cbp.gov/sites/
default/ﬁles/documents/UseofForcePolicyHandbook.pdf; see also infra at notes
100–117 and accompanying text.
9

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 740.

10

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 740.

11

See Hernández v. U.S., 802 F. Supp. 2d 834 (W.D. Tex. 2011), aff’d, 757
F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2014), adhered to in part on reh’g en banc, 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir.
2015), vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 198 L. Ed. 2d 625 (2017) and aff’d,
785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015).
12

Hernández v. U.S., 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015).

13

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971).
14

Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
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been recognized to cover Fifth Amendment15 and Eighth Amendment
claims,16 but notes that the practice of the Court implying a remedy
for federal constitutional violations in the absence of Congressional
text explicitly authorizing the same has become “a ‘disfavored’
judicial activity.”17 The danger, according to the majority, is a potential
violation of the separation of powers (judicial versus legislative);
and, in the current case, potential interference with the executive
authority entrusted to the Customs and Border Protection Agency.18
The Hernández case made its way to the Supreme Court because
the parents’ Fourth Amendment claim had been dismissed by the
lower courts on a basis that some might ﬁnd controversial—a ﬁnding
that Sergio was not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection
because he was “a Mexican citizen who had no ‘signiﬁcant voluntary
connection’ to the United States” and “was on Mexican soil at the
time that he was shot.”19 On the Fifth Amendment claim, the lower
court concluded that Agent Mesa was entitled to qualiﬁed immunity.20
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court majority side-steps both
these potentially thorny analyses by adopting what legal scholar
Philip Bobbitt terms a structural argument, supplemented by doctrinal
and prudential ones.21
Like the dissenting Justices, we ﬁnd this rather impersonal approach to the death of an unarmed teen, under circumstances that
do not appear to be legally justiﬁed,22 both disturbing and in contrast
15

See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S. Ct. 2264, 60 L. Ed. 2d 846, 19
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1390, 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 9241 (1979)
(involving a claim regarding a former Congressional staffer’s dismissal based on
sex).
16

See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S. Ct. 1468, 64 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1980)
(involving a federal prisoner’s claim for failure to provide adequate medical care).
17

Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 751–52, 206 L. Ed. 2d 29 (2020) (citing
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 198 L. Ed. 2d 290 (2017)).
18

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 752–53.

19

Hernández v. U.S., 785 F.3d 117, 119 (5th Cir. 2015), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 198 L. Ed. 2d 625 (2017) (per curiam).
20

Hernández, 785 F.3d at 120.

21

See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: A THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7–8 (1982)
(positing a typology of constitutional arguments that include historical, textual,
doctrinal, prudential, structural, and ethical arguments).
22

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 753–60 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer,
Kagan, and Sotomayor, J.J., dissenting). Based on our review and interpretation of
the video, supra note 2, and other publicized evidence about the case, we agree
with the view articulated in the dissent. See, e.g., Mark Sherman, Court Closes
Courthouse Door on slain Mexican Teen’s family, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 25, 2020),
https://www.aol.com/article/news/2020/02/25/court-closes-courthouse-door-on-slainmexican-teens-family/23934090.
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to the American ethos of “child saving” that dates back to the 1800s.23
The Court ruling came at a time when the authors here were already
involved in research examining the frequency, circumstances, and
context in which children under the age of eighteen24 were killed by
police in the year before, during, and after the controversial shooting
of eighteen-year-old Michael Brown by police ofﬁcer Darren Wilson
in Ferguson, Missouri.25 Here, we use these data to argue that the
Court’s focus on the cross-border feature of Sergio’s death allows
the majority to make a decision that devalues the lives of young
people and gives undue deference to law enforcement behavior that
is, at best, legally questionable.
In our data, we found that the risk of becoming a youthful victim of
a homicide committed by a law enforcement ofﬁcer cuts across
racial, ethnic, and gender barriers; was not limited to urban settings;
was not limited to being shot; included the very young—in one case,
a fetus; and, that despite the prolonged protests that followed the
death of Michael Brown, the number of such deaths26 had increased
rather than decreased nationally three years later; and, speciﬁcally
for Latinx youth. Though only a small number of our cases involved
a federal law enforcement ofﬁcer (2 out of 121), we agree with
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent27 that until Congress acts, a Bivens claim28
may be the only means of potentially deterring “overreach”29 by an
individual federal law enforcement ofﬁcer, because criminal prosecutions or convictions in cases where federal, state or local ofﬁcers kill
23

See BOBBITT, supra note 21, at 93–124; see also Anthony Platt, The Rise of
the Child-Saving Movement: A Study in Social Policy and Correctional Reform, 381
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 21 (1969).
24

The original research design included eighteen-year-olds among the victims,
but that number (n = 212) exceeded the capacity of the small number of students
who were initially involved in this student-led project to gather all of the relevant
data. Accordingly, the present study is limited to victims age seventeen and younger.
25

A grand jury in St. Louis County declined prosecution of Darren Wilson on
November 24, 2014. Jon Swaine, Paul Lewis, & Dan Roberts, Grand Jury Decline
to Charge Darren Wilson for Killing Michael Brown, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 25, 2014), ht
tps://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/nov/24/ferguson-police-darren-wilson-mic
hael-brown-no-charges.
26

Reported through media outlets and tracked through internet databases like
Killedbypolice.net. Police Shootings Database - Killed by Police, KILLEDBYPOLICE.NET,
https://killedbypolice.net/ (last visited May 19, 2020).
27

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 753 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

28

Lawsuits ﬁled pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 serve this purpose against
state and local police who act “under color of law”—that is, who violate the federal
constitutional rights of individuals when acting in their ofﬁcial capacity.
29

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 757 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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civilians are rare.30 In our data, for roughly sixty percent of cases, no
criminal charges were sought and the rate of civil recovery was less
than one in ﬁve.31
II. HERNÁNDEZ V. MESA: THE MAJORITY OPINION
In his classic book, Constitutional Fate,32 Bobbitt makes two points
about structural arguments that are relevant to the decision in
Hernández v. Mesa. First, “[s]tructural arguments are inferences
from the existence of constitutional structures and the relationships
which the Constitution ordains among these structures.”33 Second,
“[s]tructural arguments are largely factless and depend on deceptively simple logical moves from the entire Constitutional text rather
than from one of its parts.”34
Bobbitt describes doctrinal argument as that which “asserts
principles derived from precedent or from judicial or academic commentary on precedent.”35 And, he explains prudential argument as
“self-conscious to the reviewing institution”36 [in this case the U.S.
Supreme Court] and notes that it “need not treat the merits of the
particular controversy (which itself may or may not be constitutional),
instead [it] advance[s] particular doctrines according to the
[perceived] practical wisdom of using the courts in a particular way.”37
A primary feature of Bobbit’s prudential argument is that it requires a
balancing of competing (federal) constitutionally relevant interests.
To illustrate this point, Bobbitt refers to a hypothetical given by
Justice Hugo Black in his Charpentier Lectures at Columbia
University:
Referring to the text of the last clause of the Fifth Amendment—the
prohibition against taking private property without just compensation—
Justice Black constructed an imaginary opinion which he attributed to
“Judge X.” Judge X’s opinion, in pompous and convoluted tones, came
to the conclusion that a family farm might be seized by the Defense
Department without compensation being paid, since the takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment must be balanced against the provision for the
war power in Article I.38

Bobbitt continues his explication of the hypothetical and the
30

Delores Jones-Brown & Kwan-Lamar Blount-Hill, Convicted: Do Recent
Cases Represent a Shift in Police Accountability?, 56 CRIM. L. BULL. 270 (2020).
31

See Tables 11 and 12 infra at Part VI, Section E.

32

BOBBITT, supra note 21.

33

BOBBITT, supra note 21, at 74.

34

BOBBITT, supra note 21, at 74.

35

BOBBITT, supra note 21, at 7.

36

BOBBITT, supra note 21, at 7.

37

BOBBITT, supra note 21, at 7.

38

BOBBITT, supra note 21, at 59–60 (citing Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35
N.Y.U. L. REV. 865 (1960) (emphasis in original)).
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prudential argument by noting that, “the opinion reasoned that given
such competing texts, prudence required that a balance be struck
between a calculation of the great necessity39 and great beneﬁts of
the ofﬁcial act40 and the small harm41 incidentally worked.”42
Elements of each of these constitutional arguments can be found
in the majority opinion crafted by Justice Alito and joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh.
There is much discussion of the ways in which the issues in the
case implicate the separation of powers between the judicial, legislative, and executive branches of government (a structural argument);43
considerable discussion of the continued need to limit the applicability of the Bivens remedy as expressed in prevailing precedence (a
doctrinal argument); 44 and, the need to balance the individual
constitutional claims being made,45 against the decision’s potential
39

BOBBITT, supra note 21, 60. This is a reference to the Defense Department’s
acquisition of the strategically located land (500 acres) at a time when the government could not afford to compensate the owner for it. The hypothetical describes
the location of the land as particularly valuable for “carrying out the defense
program” and makes reference to the “great national emergency that exists.” BOBBITT, supra note 21, 60.
40

BOBBITT, supra note 21, at 60. In the hypothetical, Congress passes an act
authorizing seizure without compensation of all the lands required for the defense
establishment.
41

The “small harm” referred to is delayed or no compensation to the owner. In
this scenario, it is unlikely that the owner would see the “taking” of his 500 acres of
land without compensation as a “small harm.” For an example of how the
government’s exercise of eminent domain is a continuing constitutional problem,
see Ilya Somin, The Growing Battle over the Use of Eminent Domain to Take
Property for Pipelines, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 7, 2016, 11:45 AM), https://www.wa
shingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/06/07/the-growing-battle-over-th
e-use-of-eminent-domain-to-take-property-for-pipelines/; Ilya Somin, Donald Trump’s
History of Eminent Domain Abuse, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 19, 2015, 3:05 PM), htt
ps://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/08/19/donald-trump
s-abuse-of-eminent-domain/.
42

BOBBITT, supra note 21, at 60.

43

Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743–47, 206 L. Ed. 2d 29 (2020).

44

See Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68, 122 S. Ct. 515,
151 L. Ed. 2d 456 (2001); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 198 L. Ed. 2d 290
(2017); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18, 100 S. Ct. 1468, 64 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1980).
In fact, in Justice Thomas’ concurring opinion, joined by Justice Gorsuch, he recommends that the Bivens decision be overruled. Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 750
(Thomas, J., concurring).
45

There is a structural concern here as well, since neither Sergio nor his
parents were/are U.S. citizens and because the death occurred on Mexican “soil”
according to the lower court decisions they were not subject to the jurisdiction of the
U.S. and therefore not entitled to its constitutional protections. However, as argued
by the dissent, since the action which caused the death of Sergio was performed by
a U.S. border patrol agent, standing on U.S. “soil”, reportedly in furtherance of his
© 2020 Thomson Reuters E Criminal Law Bulletin E Vol. 56 No. 5
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impact on national security and foreign relations (a prudential
argument).46
In arriving at its ruling that the Bivens’ holding does not extend to
claims based on a cross-border shooting,47 the majority opinion effectively denied Sergio’s parents access to the U.S. civil courts as
an albeit hollow remedy for the loss of the life of their teenage son,
despite the otherwise clear applicability of Bivens. That is, the killing
occurred at the hands of a federal law enforcement agent while
Sergio was apparently unarmed, running away, and not engaged in
a forcible felony—circumstances which the Court has ruled violates
the federal constitution.48 Structural, doctrinal, and prudential arguments allowed the majority to make their decision without having to
address the substantive constitutional claims raised by Sergio’s
parents on behalf of their dead son—i.e., that Sergio was unlawfully
seized under the Fourth Amendment and denied due process under
the Fifth Amendment. Indeed, the majority never addresses the
merit of these claims. Instead, the majority adopts the ﬁndings of a
DOJ investigation that concluded Agent Mesa’s actions were reasonable under the circumstances and not in violation of CBP policies or
training.49 The majority reaches this conclusion via a cursory reference to a DOJ press release, rather than by a full, complete, and
independent analysis of the DOJ’s investigatory report and the facts
of the case.50
The differences in the legal reasoning used by the majority and
the dissenting Justices are as stark as their personal identities.51
duty to “protect” the integrity of the U.S. border, Sergio was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. It seems mere folly to suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment might be applicable to Sergio’s death had he been killed by state or local law
enforcers but he was not entitled to any constitutional protection from being killed
by a federal law enforcement agent.
46

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 743–47. It should be noted that Justice Black
derided the prudential argument as “subversive” of the Constitution. See BOBBITT,
supra note 21, at 59.
47

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 739.

48

See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1
(1985) (holding the Fourth Amendment limits police use of deadly force to apprehend ﬂeeing suspects).
49

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 740.

50

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 744.

51

Social psychologists have documented ways in which one’s personal identity
can inﬂuence behavior and thought. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (describing the relational
nature of women’s decision-making as compared to men’s); Jennifer L. Eberhardt,
Phillip Atiba Goff, Valerie J. Purdie, & Paul G. Davies, Seeing Black: Race, Crime,
and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876 (2004) (explaining the
concept of implicit bias and its effects on individual interpretation of visual cues);
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Five men,52 four of whom are White53 and one of whom is Black,54
ruled against Sergio’s parents, who are Latinx.55 Three women,56
one of whom is Latina,57 and one White man58 dissented from the
majority decision using an analysis that includes legal reasoning and
a close examination of the facts of the underlying case. For the
Court’s majority, the Hernández incident was entirely or primarily a
question of whether the Hernández family was entitled to a Bivens
action.59 As noted previously, under Bivens, the Court announced its
power to craft a legal remedy (i.e., money damages) for violations of
rights guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution even in the absence
of speciﬁc congressional authorization to do so.60 In that case, the
Court (1) set aside any argument that state law alone provides
Rebecca C. Hetey & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, The Numbers Don’t Speak for
Themselves: Racial Disparities and the Persistence of Inequality in the Criminal
Justice System, 27 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 183 (2018) (documenting that
bringing racial disparities to mind can trigger fear and stereotypic associations linking Blacks with crime). We believe that Juliet Stumpf’s work on crimmigration supports the likelihood of similar thoughts about Latinx immigrants. Juliet P Stumpf,
The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. UNIV. L.
REV. 367 (2006).
52

Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel
Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh.
53

Justices Roberts, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh.

54

Justice Thomas.

55

See Sherman, supra note 22. Sergio’s mother, Maria Guadalupe Güereca,
said she will continue to seek justice for her son. See KTSM 9 News, Mother
Speaks Out Following Supreme Court Ruling in Teenage Son’s Death Case, YOUTUBE
(Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yWHGQeAP2vU.
56

Associate Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan.

57

Justice Sotomayor.

58

Justice Stephen Breyer.

59

See Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 753 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent points out that, “[w]hen the case ﬁrst reached this Court, the
Court remanded it, instructing the Court of Appeals to resolve a threshold question:
Is the Bivens remedy available to noncitizens (here, the victim’s parents) when the
U.S. Ofﬁcer acted stateside, but the impact of his alleged wrongdoing was suffered
abroad.” In the majority opinion, the Court appears to abandon this particular
structural argument in favor of one less contentious—separation of powers and the
presence or absence of Congressional intent to provide a Bivens-like remedy for
individuals who claim they were harmed by federal law enforcement behavior in
violation of provisions of the federal constitution.
60

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 389, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971). The Court writes,
The Fourth Amendment provides that “The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated . . .” In Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), we reserved the question
whether violation of that command by a federal agent acting under color of his authority
gives rise to a cause of action for damages consequent upon his unconstitutional conduct.
Today we hold that it does.
© 2020 Thomson Reuters E Criminal Law Bulletin E Vol. 56 No. 5
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adequate civil remedies for the improper actions of federal agents;61
and (2) asserted that courts could grant legal remedies to these
violations in much the same way as Congress has authorized them
to grant other equitable remedies.62 The Bivens opinion supported
the general proposition that a right without a corresponding remedy
is no right at all.63
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. The Court ﬁnds the language of the Fourth Amendment
sufﬁcient to authorize a remedy for its violation:
That damages may be obtained for injuries consequent upon a violation of the Fourth
Amendment by federal ofﬁcials should hardly seem a surprising proposition . . . Of
course, the Fourth Amendment does not in so many words provide for its enforcement by
an award of money damages for the consequences of its violation. But “it is . . . well
settled that, where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a
general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to
make good the wrong done.”

Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684, 66 S. Ct. 773, 90 L.
Ed. 939, 13 A.L.R.2d 383 (1946)).
61

On this matter, the Court writes,

[J]ust as state law may not authorize federal agents to violate the Fourth Amendment
. . . neither may state law undertake to limit the extent to which federal authority can be
exercised . . . The inevitable consequence of this dual limitation on state power is that
the federal question becomes . . . an independent claim both necessary and sufﬁcient to
make out the plaintiff’s cause of action.

Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395.
62

In Bivens, the Court responds to whether money damages are an appropriate relief for violations of the Fourth Amendment:
[W]e cannot accept respondents’ formulation of the question as whether the availability of
money damages is necessary to enforce the Fourth Amendment. For we have here no
explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal ofﬁcer’s violation of the
Fourth Amendment may not recover money damages from the agents, but must instead
be remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress.

Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397. In his concurrence, Justice Harlan adds,
[A]t the very least, it strikes me as no more appropriate to await express congressional
authorization of traditional judicial relief with regard to these legal interests [recognized in
the Bill of Rights] than with respect to interests protected by federal statutes . . . [I]t
seems to me that the range of policy considerations we may take into account is at least
as broad as the range of those a legislature would consider with respect to an express
statutory authorization of a traditional remedy.

Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407. Justice Harlan also ﬁnds implied authorization from
Congress to grant both equitable and legal relief:
Congress provided specially for the exercise of equitable remedial powers by federal
courts, see Act of May 8, 1792, § 2, 1 Stat. 276; C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 257 (2d
ed., 1970) . . . [I]f a general grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts by Congress is
thought adequate to empower a federal court to grant equitable relief for all areas of
subject matter jurisdiction enumerated therein, see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331(a), then it seems
to me that the same statute is sufﬁcient to empower a federal court to grant a traditional
remedy at law.

Bivens, 403 U.S. at 404–05.
63

The majority writes,

[The Fourth Amendment] guarantees to citizens of the United States the absolute right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures carried out by virtue of federal authority.
And “where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the
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In Hernández v. Mesa, the majority notes that Bivens was decided
at a time when the Court exhibited a greater willingness to interpret
law in accordance with its “spirit” as opposed to being constrained
by its “letter,”64 and, as noted in Justice Thomas’s concurrence, the
Court has embraced something of a presumption against future applications of Bivens.65 The majority opinion makes much of the fact
that the Bivens’ remedy has been extended in only two cases
subsequent to its announcement in 1971, nearly ﬁve decades ago.66
Justice Alito speciﬁcally quotes Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Ziglar v.
Abbasi67 in which the majority referred to Bivens as part of an ancien
régime—an old rule.68 Nevertheless, the majority rejects Justice
Thomas’ inclination to overrule the Bivens decision,69 and maintains
that the ruling remains controlling law for cases that involve facts
similar to those presented in it.70 For cases with facts that are
substantively different from Bivens, the majority maintains that the
availability of the remedy is limited. Citing Ziglar v. Abbasi71 and Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko72 as precedent, the majority applied a three-part analysis in determining whether the parents
of Sergio Hernández would be entitled to seek relief. In their view,
beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary
relief.”

Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. at 392).
64

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 741.

65

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 750 (Thomas, J., concurring).

66

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 741 (citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979);
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S. Ct. 1468, 64 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1980)).
67

Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855, 198 L. Ed. 2d 290 (2017).

68

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 741.

69

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 753 (Thomas, J., concurring).

70

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 743; Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 752 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). In Bivens, Justice Brennan sums the facts of the case:
This case has its origin in an arrest and search carried out on the morning of November
26, 1965. Petitioner’s complaint alleged that, on that day, respondents, agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics acting under claim of federal authority, entered his apartment
and arrested him for alleged narcotics violations. The agents manacled petitioner in front
of his wife and children, and threatened to arrest the entire family. They searched the
apartment from stem to stern. Thereafter, petitioner was taken to the federal courthouse
in Brooklyn, where he was interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip search.
On July 7, 1967, petitioner brought suit in Federal District Court. In addition to the allegations above, his complaint asserted that the arrest and search were effected without a
warrant, and that unreasonable force was employed in making the arrest; fairly read, it alleges as well that the arrest was made without probable cause. [Footnote 1] Petitioner
claimed to have suffered great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering as a
result of the agents’ unlawful conduct, and sought $15,000 damages from each of them.

Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
71

Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1849.

72

Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68, 122 S. Ct. 515, 151
L. Ed. 2d 456 (2001).
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under that existing case law, when there is a case involving a new
“context” or a “new class of defendants,” Bivens can only be
extended to cover such facts where there can be found no “reason
to pause” before applying the doctrine.73
The majority succinctly summarizes the holding and rationale in
this somewhat complex, multi-part, twenty-page majority opinion as
follows:
We are asked in this case to extend Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed.
Narcotics Agents . . . and create a damages remedy for a crossborder shooting. As we have made clear in many prior cases, however,
the Constitution’s separation of powers requires us to exercise caution
before extending Bivens to a new “context,” and a claim based on a
cross-border shooting arises in a context that is markedly new.74

The summary continues:
Unlike any previously recognized Bivens claim, a cross-border shooting claim has foreign relations and national security implications. In addition, Congress has been notably hesitant to create claims based on
allegedly tortious conduct abroad. Because of the distinctive characteristics of cross-border shooting claims, we refuse to extend Bivens into
this new ﬁeld.75
73

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 743. It appears, under this majority, that all future
Bivens claims will be in a new context. The facts of Bivens might be summarized as
an instance where federal law enforcement overstepped constitutional bounds by
unlawfully asserting Fourth Amendment search and seizure authority and causing
the plaintiff material damage. But one might also note that, in Bivens, it was the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics speciﬁcally that caused the injury; perhaps asserting a
claim against a different law enforcement agency is sufﬁcient to make the context
“new.” In fact, in Hernández, Justice Alito distinguishes U.S. Customs and Border
Patrol from the agencies in previous cases, writing,
There is a world of difference between those claims and petitioners’ cross-border shooting claims . . .
While Border Patrol agents often work miles from the border, some, like Agent Mesa,
are stationed right at the border and have the responsibility of attempting to prevent illegal
entry. For these reasons, the conduct of agents positioned at the border has a clear and
strong connection to national security, as the Fifth Circuit understood.

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 744, 746. Nonetheless, agents of the Drug Enforcement
Administration; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives; and other federal law enforcement agencies handle
cases involving transnational criminal markets or international terrorists plots. Might
the international nature of their work also make claims against their agents a “new
context”? As the majority’s “understanding of a ‘new context’ is broad,” it is unclear
what constitutes a sufﬁcient difference in circumstances to trigger Malesko’s
limitations.
74

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 739 (internal citations omitted).

75

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 739. Consider the core questions whose afﬁrmative
answers give “reason to pause”: (1) Is there “risk of interfering with the authority of
the other branches’ ’’? Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 743. (2) Are there ‘‘ ‘sound reasons
to think Congress might doubt the efﬁcacy or necessity of a damages remedy’ ’’?
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III.

THE HERNÁNDEZ V. MESA DISSENT

A powerfully written dissenting opinion authored by Justice
Ginsburg and joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan,
elucidates the problem with approaching the Hernández case in the
stoic,76 legally formulaic manner taken by the majority. As noted
previously, the majority’s discussion stands in stark contrast to the
detailed ﬁndings of the dissent, which drives the latter to draw
contrary conclusions. In fact, Justice Ginsburg and her fellow dissenters opined that a Bivens remedy should be available to the
noncitizen parents of Sergio Hernández because “[r]ogue U.S. ofﬁcer conduct falls within a familiar, not a ‘new,’ Bivens setting.”77
They also note that, “[e]ven if the setting could be characterized as
‘new,’ plaintiffs lack recourse to alternative remedies,”78 a point on
which the Bivens ruling turns.79
Again, in direct contrast to the majority, the dissenting opinion
Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 743. (3) Is the judicial branch “well-suited” to consider the
consequences of granting a remedy? Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 743.
The answer to the ﬁrst question will inevitably be “yes” whenever a case
implicates Fourth Amendment restrictions on search and seizure powers. In Bivens,
Justice Harlen writes, “The judiciary has a particular responsibility to assure the
vindication of constitutional interests . . . [T]he Bill of Rights is particularly intended
to vindicate the interests of the individual in the face of the popular will as expressed
in legislative majorities.” Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407. As the Fourth Amendment was
especially designed to “interfere” with the Executive branch, it is hard to imagine
where granting a remedy for its violation would not do so.
To the second question— setting aside the practical impossibility of ascribing
single-minded certainty to a body of 535 equals—it is easy to “doubt” lawmakers’
desire to allow individuals to sue in response to federal misconduct given the
Congress’ incentive to reserve the public purse for its own priorities. That the
Constitution protects individual liberty “in the face” of Congress and the popular
majority it represents makes Congress’ doubt about remedies for its violation irrelevant.
As for this third question, the Justices spoil the surprise by emphasizing the
notions that creating a legal remedy is a lawmaking act; that courts neither have the
authority nor expertise to make law; and, in case the conclusion is not clear, that
“[t]he correct ‘answer most often will be Congress.’ ’’ Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 741–
43, 750. It may be a high bar to convince this majority that the courts are well suited
to craft legal remedies absent input and approval from Congress. Despite the
majority’s failure to overrule Bivens in the instant case, a cruder reading of the
majority’s opinion is that Bivens is dead letter law.
76

The majority opinion’s isolated reference to Sergio’s death as presenting a
“tragic case” notwithstanding, Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 739, the tone of the majority
opinion is devoid of human compassion or empathy.
77

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 753 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

78

This was a key point in the Bivens ruling. Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 755
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 409–10, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
79

Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392.
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ﬁnds that, “no ‘special factors’ counsel against a Bivens remedy.”80
Similarly, the opinion notes that “[n]either U.S. foreign policy nor
national security is in fact endangered by the litigation.”81 Later in the
dissent, the dissenters note that the impact of the majority opinion is
likely to be “quite the opposite”82 of the governmental interests that it
purports to safeguard.83 In the view of the dissenters, “[w]ithholding
a Bivens suit here threatens to exacerbate bilateral relations . . .
and in no way fosters our international commitments.”84 To support
this contention, the dissent notes that concerns about interference
with the executive branch’s foreign policy and national security powers is immaterial as the ofﬁcer conduct at issue took place within the
domestic territory of the United States.85
The opinion highlights the fact that, in addition to the effort to
make plaintiffs whole, the intent of the Bivens Court was that such
claims would be used to deter misconduct of constitutional dimensions by federal law enforcement agents.86 Consequently they further
ﬁnd that, Sergio’s “location at the precise moment that the bullet
landed should not matter one whit”87 since throughout the litigation,
“[i]t is not asserted that Mesa ‘knew on which side of the boundary
line [his] bullet would land’;”88 and, that “[a]t the time of the incident,
it is uncontested that the ofﬁcer did not know whether the boy he
shot was a U.S. National or a citizen of another land.”89 Finally, and
perhaps most damning to the majority’s position, the dissent takes
note that, at oral argument, Mesa acknowledged that “Hernandez’s
parents could have maintained a Bivens action had the bullet hit
80

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 753 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

81

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 753 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

82

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 759 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

83

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 753 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

84

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 753 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

85

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 757 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

86

Bivens claims allow federal ofﬁcers to be sued in much the same way that
§ 1983 suits were designed for this purpose in cases that involve state and local
law enforcement action. See, e.g., James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking
Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117 (2009) (arguing that Congress has enacted legislation that expressly conﬁrmed the availability of
civil actions against federal ofﬁcials for violations of the Constitution and, therefore,
that Bivens actions should routinely be applicable against federal actors to the
same extent that § 1983 applies to state actors).
87

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 756 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

88

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 757 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

89

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 753 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Sergio while he was running up or down the United States side of
the embankment.”90
In keeping with the opinion’s consistent condemnation of Agent
Mesa’s conduct, the dissenters contend that he should not reap the
beneﬁt of happenstance—“the fortuity that the bullet happened to
strike Hernández on the Mexican side of the embankment.”91 They
emphasize that the Bivens ruling should be applicable in the Hernández case because “the primary purpose of the tort rule involved is to
deter or punish [federal law enforcement] misconduct.”92 Consequently, they conclude that, “although the bullet happened to land on
the Mexican side of the culvert, the United States . . . unquestionably has jurisdiction to prescribe law governing a Border Patrol
agent’s conduct [and] [t]hat prescriptive jurisdiction reaches ‘conduct
that . . . takes place within [United States] territory.’ ’’93 In sum, the
dissenting opinion ﬁnds that the Malesko limitations relied on by the
majority were inappropriately applied because Hernández’s case
presents no new context; and, even if it did, it involves no reason to
pause because foreign policy and the integrity of the borders are no
more implicated here than in a domestic shooting of a similarly situated victim.
IV. “SEEING” HERNÁNDEZ V. MESA THROUGH COMPETING INTERPRETIVE
LENSES94
Examining the sharp contrasts in the conclusions drawn by these
legal scholars and guardians of the public trust begs the question:
How could they “see” the matter so differently? Public opinion polls
document the fact that law enforcement behavior is a highly political
governmental function about which there is the least amount of
public consensus.95 By adopting a structural argument in its ﬁnal
determination of Hernández v. Mesa, the majority of the Justices
90

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 756 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal citations
omitted).
91

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 756 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

92

(THIRD)

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 757 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 (AM. LAW INST. 1986)).

93

Presumably, the dissenters see Agent Mesa’s ﬁring a weapon at Sergio
Hernández as in violation of the Court’s ruling in Garner because it involved using
lethal force against a person who “pose[d] no immediate threat to the ofﬁcer and no
threat to others.” Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 756 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471
U.S. 1, 11, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985). For a detailed discussion of the
implications of the Garner ruling, see Jones-Brown & Blount-Hill, supra note 30.
94

See GILLIGAN, supra note 51; Eberhardt et al., supra note 51; Goff et al.,
supra note 3.
95

See, e.g., U.S. District Judge Shira Scheindlin’s decision on the stopquestion-frisk controversy in New York City in Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F.
Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), for additional opinion, see, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668
(S.D.N.Y. 2013), stay pending appeal denied, 959 F. Supp. 2d 691 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
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avoid grappling with the underlying facts in the case, which the dissent and multiple amicus briefs demonstrate, negatively implicate
law enforcement practices at the U.S./Mexico border.96 From the
view of the majority, “[w]hen evaluating whether to extend Bivens,
the most important question ‘is ‘who should decide’ whether to
provide for a damages remedy, Congress or the courts?”97 Without
even attempting an independent examination or analysis of the
constitutionality of the behavior complained of, they decide that the
answer is “undoubtedly” Congress.98 However, in the view of the dissenters, the most important question is whether “the plaintiffs can
sue Mesa in federal court for violating their son’s Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights?”99 This question is consistent with the plaintiffs’
claim that Agent Mesa’s conduct amounts to “rogue action of a rankand-ﬁle law enforcement ofﬁcer acting in violation of the rules
controlling his ofﬁce.”100
The following excerpt from CBP policy calls into question the
majority’s blanket acceptance of the DOJ’s investigative conclusion
“that Agent Mesa had not violated Customs and Border Patrol policy
or training:”101
1. CBP policy on the use of force by Authorized Ofﬁcers/Agents is
derived from constitutional law, as interpreted by federal courts
and subsequent determination, 302 F.R.D. 69, 89 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 121 (S.D. N.Y.
2014), aff’d in part, appeal dismissed in part, 770 F.3d 1051, 201 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
3309, 89 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1690 (2d Cir. 2014); see also EMILY EKINS, POLICING AMERICA:
UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE POLICE: RESULTS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY,
CATO INST. (2016), https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/ﬁles/survey-reports/pdf/policin
g-in-america-august-1-2017.pdf (reporting on racial, ethnic, and political differences
in attitudes toward the police); MICHAEL D. WHITE & HENRY F. FRADELLA, STOP AND FRISK:
THE USE AND ABUSE OF A CONTROVERSIAL POLICE TACTIC (2016) (evaluating the legal and
social contexts of New York’s stop-question-frisk policing strategy); Shaun L. Gabbidon, George Higgins, & Kidesti Wilder-Bonner, Black Supporters of Racial Proﬁling:
A Demographic Proﬁle, 24 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 422 (2013) (analyzing multiple
demographic variables and political differences among Blacks who support racial
proﬁling even though such policing practices typically negatively affect communities
of color).
96

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 759–60 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

97

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 750 (citing Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857,
198 L. Ed. 2d 290 (2017); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 380, 103 S. Ct. 2404, 76 L.
Ed. 2d 648 (1983)).
98

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 750.

99

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 760 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

100

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 760 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing 8 C.F.R.
§ 287.8(a)(2)(ii) (2019) (limiting the use of deadly force by federal agents).
101

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 740. We do note that since Agent Mesa killed
Sergio in 2010, the guidelines excerpted here may differ from those at the time of
the shooting. However, since the guidelines do not include any case law that was
not already in existence at the time of the shooting, with the exception of the
requirement to render assistance, we have no reason to suspect that they do.
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2.
3.

4.

5.

6.
7.

8.

in cases such as Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S. Ct.
1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989) and Tennessee v. Garner, 471
U.S. 1, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985), federal statutes
and applicable DHS and CBP policies.
Authorized Ofﬁcers/Agents may use “objectively reasonable”
force only when it is necessary to carry out their law enforcement duties.
The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force is based on
the totality of circumstances known by the ofﬁcer/agent at the
time of the use of force and weighs the actions of the ofﬁcer/
agent against the rights of the subject in light of the circumstances surrounding the event. Reasonableness will be judged
from the perspective of a reasonable ofﬁcer/agent on the scene,
rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.
The calculus of reasonableness embodies an allowance for the
fact that law enforcement ofﬁcers/agents are often forced to
make split-second decisions in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that
is necessary in a particular situation.
A use of force is “necessary” when it is reasonably required to
carry out the Authorized Ofﬁcer’s/Agent’s law enforcement duties in a given situation, considering the totality of facts and
circumstances of such particular situation. A use of deadly
force is “necessary” when the ofﬁcer/agent has a reasonable
belief that the subject of such force poses an imminent danger
of death or serious physical injury to the ofﬁcer/agent or to
another person.
An Authorized Ofﬁcer/Agent may have to rapidly escalate or
de-escalate through use of force options, depending on the
totality of facts and circumstances of the particular situation.
Based on the totality of circumstances, different ofﬁcers/agents
may have different responses to the same situation, any of
which may be both reasonable and necessary. The level of
force applied must reﬂect the totality of circumstances surrounding the situation, including the presence of imminent
danger to the ofﬁcer/agent or others.
If feasible, and if to do so would not increase the danger to the
ofﬁcer/agent or others, a verbal warning to submit to the authority of the ofﬁcer/agent shall be given prior to the use of force. If
a particular situation allows for the issuance of a verbal warning, the ofﬁcer/agent:
a. Should have a reasonable basis to believe that the subject
can comprehend and comply with the warning; and
b. Allow sufﬁcient time between the warning and the use of
force to give the subject a reasonable opportunity to
voluntarily comply with the warning.
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9. Following any incident involving the use of force, Authorized
Ofﬁcers/Agents shall seek medical assistance for any person
who appears, or claims to be, injured.102
Much of the language in these general guidelines is drawn nearly
verbatim from the case law cited. As we, and apparently the dissenting justices, read these guidelines and the cases from which they
are drawn, there are several key standards that must be met for an
agent’s conduct to be compliant with policy and law. The agent’s use
of force, whether deadly or less than lethal, must be “necessary,”
“objectively reasonable,”103 and used (only) to carry out legitimate
enforcement duties. 104 The guidelines speciﬁcally note that the
reasonableness assessment includes weighing the ofﬁcer’s actions
against the rights of the subject. Additionally, the guidelines limit the
use of deadly force to those situations in which there is factual
evidence that indicates imminent danger—speciﬁcally, the risk of
death or serious physical injury—to the agent or others.105 The
guidelines also require that, when practicable, agents must (1) issue
a verbal warning prior to the application of force; (2) consider the
ability of the subject to comprehend and comply with the warning;
(3) allow sufﬁcient time for voluntary compliance before applying
force; and (4) if after the application of force, the person appears
injured or claims to be injured, the guidelines impose an afﬁrmative
duty on the agent to seek medical assistance for that person. These
are pretty high standards that we nor the dissenting justices believe
were met by the conduct that appears on the grainy video of the
incident.106
Since different reports of the events that led to Sergio’s death
have been provided by Agent Mesa and Sergio’s companions who
were present at the scene of the shooting, it seems likely that the
divergence in the majority’s opinion and its underlying reasoning
102

CBP, USE

OF

FORCE POLICY, supra note 8, at 1–2.

103

See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d
443 (1989) for a fuller explication of what this requirement means.
104

We interpret the word “necessary” in this context as meaning that the lawful
objective of the agent could not be achieved by means other than the use of force.
See, e.g., SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT MANUAL § 8.050 (2019) (‘‘ ‘Necessary’ means
that no reasonably effective alternative to the use of force appeared to exist and
that the amount of force used was reasonable to effect the lawful purpose
intended.”), http://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-8—-use-of-force/8050—-use-o
f-force-deﬁnitions. For a more in-depth explanation of what “objectively reasonable”
means, see Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d
443 (1989).
105

In Garner, the majority concludes that the quantum of factual evidence
required must amount to probable cause. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11, 105
S. Ct. 1694, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985).
106

See Grosscrime2, supra note 2.
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from that of the dissent may be due, in large part, to each adopting
one recitation of the facts over the other. The majority opinion notes
that:
Petitioners and Agent Mesa disagree about what Hernández and his
friends were doing at the time of the shooting. According to petitioners,
they were simply playing a game, running across the culvert, touching
the fence on the U.S. side, and then running back across the border.
[But] [a]ccording to Agent Mesa, Hernández and his friends were
involved in an illegal border crossing attempt, and they pelted him with
rocks.107

Based on our viewing, the rock throwing reported by Agent Mesa
is not visible on the video and, because Sergio was running away
from the U.S. side of the culvert, it seems clear that the illegal border
crossing had ended or was in the process of being terminated at the
time Mesa drew his weapon and ﬁred. Even giving deference to the
Graham v. Connor observation that enforcement ofﬁcers/agents are
often forced to make split-second decisions in circumstances that
are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving, we ask what law enforcement duties were being carried out by Mesa when he drew his
weapon and shot at Sergio? And what facts led him to believe that
he was in imminent danger of death or serious physical injury from
the ﬂeeing teen?
The majority’s acceptance of the DOJ’s determination that Agent
Mesa’s conduct did not violate the policies and training of the agency
for which he worked is substantially at odds with Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent. In that opinion, Justice Ginsburg afﬁrmatively states that
she accepts Sergio’s parents’ allegations as true because the case
was resolved on a motion to dismiss the complaint:
In 2010, Sergio Adrian Hernández Güereca, a 15-year-old citizen of
Mexico, was playing with his friends in the dry culvert that divides El
Paso, Texas, from Ciudad Juarez, Mexico . . . The game Hernández
and his friends were playing involved running up the embankment on
the United States side, touching the barbed-wire fence, and running
back down to the Mexican side.108

She continues: “While the game was ongoing, Border Patrol Agent
Jesus Mesa, Jr., appeared on his bicycle and detained one of
Hernández’s friends as he was running down the embankment on
the U.S. side. Hernández, who was unarmed, retreated into Mexican
territory.”109
As noted previously, under this version of the facts, any violation
associated with an illegal border crossing had ended. Therefore, in
our view and that of the dissenting Justices, in the obvious absence
107

Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 740, 206 L. Ed. 2d 29 (2020).

108

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 753 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

109

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 753 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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of evidence supporting an imminent threat of serious physical injury
or death, what is described as happening next can only be legally
justiﬁed if the statute prohibiting illegal border crossings makes
provision for a penalty of death upon arrest and conviction.110 Yet, as
the dissent makes clear, “Mesa pointed his weapon across the
border, ‘seemingly taking careful aim,’ and ﬁred at least two shots
. . . one of [which] struck Hernández in the face, killing him.”111
The readiness of Agent Mesa to interpret Sergio’s behavior as
conduct warranting the application of deadly force—as well as the
majority’s and DOJ’s acceptance of Mesa’s actions as legally appropriate—have strong implications for a concept that law professor
Juliet P. Stumpf calls crimmigration. In her American University Law
Review article titled, “The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime,
and Sovereign Power,” Professor Stumpf uses the term to describe
what she has identiﬁed as the conﬂuence of the criminal and immigration law apparatuses.112 She posits that, in the United States,
crimmigration is manifested through criminalizing immigration violations and procedures, and militarizing and intensifying immigration
enforcement.113 According to Stumpf,114 crimmigration speciﬁes some
individuals as “legal” or innocent and others as “illegal” or guilty.
Members of groups that are designated as illegal are not entitled to
the rights and protections of citizenship (e.g., undocumented immigrants or felons).115 Building on Stumpf’s ideas, criminology professors Jize Jiang and Edna Erez maintain that crimmigration practices
are bolstered by racialized societal narratives about threat and
biopolitical notions of illegality and citizenship which are used to
justify the punitive treatment of undocumented immigrants,116 or, as
in the instant case, even temporary border crossers. Various sources
110

Cf. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7–22, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1
(1985). Note that the complaint ﬁled by Garner’s father alleged that the shooting
violated the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The Eighth
Amendment claim stemmed from the fact that the offense of burglary, of which
young Garner was suspected, was no longer punishable by death. Consequently, to
subject him to deadly force while only a suspect, denied him due process and
subjected him to a greater consequence than authorized by statute had he been
convicted.
111

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 753 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

112

Stumpf, supra note 51, at 380–92.

113

Stumpf, supra note 51, at 380–92; see also García Hernández & César
Cuauhtémoc, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1457 (2014); García Hernández & César Cuauhtémoc, Deconstructing Crimmigration, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 197
(2018).
114

Stumpf, supra note 51, at 380.

115

Stumpf, supra note 51, at 401.

116

Jize Jiang & Edna Erez. Immigrants as Symbolic Assailants: Crimmigration
and Its Discontents, 28 INT’L CRIM. JUST. REV. 5, 5 (2018) (explaining crimmigration as
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conﬁrm that Latinos are racialized as undocumented immigrants in
the public consciousness117 and that, as a group, they are disproportionately harmed by crimmigration.118 Existing scholarship documents the ways in which immigration enforcement, particularly
measures that involve the police, subject Latinos to macro- and
micro-aggressions,119 ethno-racial proﬁling,120 and police abuses.121
To support its claim that the Court must deny the Hernández family access to a Bivens claim as a matter of national security, the
majority expends considerable ink describing the “dangerous people”
(in its view) federal agents, including those who patrol the border
regularly encounter.122 Consider, for example, the following statement from the Court:
During the last ﬁscal year, approximately 850,000 persons were apprehended attempting to enter the United States illegally from Mexico,
and large numbers of drugs were smuggled across the border. In addi“the interactive product of minority threat, partisan politics, and federalism of the
American government system, which have jointly formed a ‘multilayered patchwork’
of immigration control”); see also AMADA ARMENTA, PROTECT, SERVE, AND DEPORT: THE RISE
OF POLICING AS IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 147 (2017) (explaining crimmigration law as
“a new mode of social control designed to exclude and punish non-citizens”); KATJA
FRANKO, THE CRIMMIGRANT OTHER: MIGRATION AND PENAL POWER (2020) (documenting the
emergence of the “crimmigrant other” as a central ﬁgure in immigration discourse);
Michael Light & Ty Miller, Does Undocumented Immigration Increase Violent Crime?,
56 CRIMINOLOGY 370 (2017) (answering the question posted in the article title in the
negative); Graham C. Ousey & Charis E. Kubrin, Immigration and Crime: Assessing
a Contentious Issue, 2018 ANN. REV. OF CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2018) (reporting the results of
a meta-analysis on ﬁfty-one studies that immigration is linked to a reduction in
crime); Akiv Dawson, “The Keyword Is Illegal”: Police Violence in America’s New
Crimmigration Control System (2020) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Howard
University) (on ﬁle with authors).
117

THE

ARMENTA, supra note 116; LEO CHAVEZ, COVERING IMMIGRATION: POPULAR IMAGES
POLITICS OF THE NATION (2001).

AND

118

Amada Armenta, Racializing Crimmigration, 3 SOC. RACE & ETHNICITY 82 (2017).

119

Mary Romero, Racial Proﬁling and Immigration Law Enforcement: Rounding
Up of Usual Suspects in the Latino Community, 32 CRITICAL SOC. 447 (2006); Seline
Szkupinski-Quiroga, Dulce M. Medina, & Jennifer Glick, In the Belly of the Beast:
Effects of Anti-Immigration Policy on Latino Community Members, 58 AM. BEHAV. SCI.
1723 (2014).
120

Katharine M. Donato & Leslie Ann Rodríguez, Police Arrests in a Time of
Uncertainty, 58 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 1696 (2014).
121

See Justin T. Pickett, On the Social Foundations for Crimmigration: Latino
Threat and Support for Expanded Police Powers, 32 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 103
(2016). Recently, sociologist Akiv Dawson examined lethal force as a consequence
of crimmigration enforcement. DAWSON, supra note 116. Her study focused on the
interior United States. Cases such as Hernández v. Mesa highlight the need for
more attention to the effects of crimmigration at the U.S.-Mexico border, generally,
and the use of deadly force by U.S. border patrol agents, in particular.
122

Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 746, 206 L. Ed. 2d 29 (2020).
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tion, powerful criminal organizations operating on both sides of the
border present a serious law enforcement problem for both countries.123

The opinion goes on to note that,
[o]n the United States’ side, the responsibility for attempting to prevent
the entry of dangerous persons . . . rests primarily with the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection Agency, and one of its main responsibilities is to “detect, respond to, and interdict terrorists, drug smugglers
and trafﬁckers, human smugglers and trafﬁckers, and other persons
who may undermine the security of the United States.”124

These statements are emblematic of the conﬂuence of criminal law
(or more accurately criminalization) and immigration enforcement
about which Stumpf warns.
By its own admission, one of the reasons the majority denies the
Hernández family access to a Bivens claim is the fear that allowing
such civil actions will undermine border security, 125 especially
because the threat of civil liability might impact the behavior of border
patrol agents.126 In our view, this is a political decision, although the
opinion suggests that only the other branches of government are
political.127
Recalling our assertion that law enforcement behavior is highly
political and a governmental function about which there is the least
amount of public consensus,128 consider the subjectivity of the following claim the majority made in Hernández: “The United States
has an interest in ensuring that agents assigned this difﬁcult task of
policing the border are held to standards and judged by procedures
that satisfy United States law and do not undermine the agent’s effectiveness and morale”.129 In our view, this is perhaps one of the
most controversial statements in the Court’s opinion, as it denigrates
the law-making and procedural standards of Mexico and prioritizes
the life of one of its young citizens below the potential hurt feelings
of a U.S. border patrol agent. Additionally, the Court fails to provide
any factual evidence that unfettered CBP discretion and action has
effectively curbed illegal immigration or cross-border criminal activity.
By conﬂating border crossings and undocumented immigration with
transnational crime, it is possible that the DOJ’s determination that
123

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 746 (internal citations omitted).

124

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 746 (citing 6 U.S.C.A. § 211(c)(5)).

125

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 747.

126

The majority suggests that ruling in favor of Sergio’s parents might interfere
with border patrol agent’s willingness to do their jobs. In the domestic law enforcement context, this would be called de-policing.
127

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 744, 746–47.

128

See supra note 95 and accompanying text.

129

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 745 (emphasis added).
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Mesa’s conduct did not violate his agency training is correct—
especially if such training similarly encouraged agents to adopt a
presumption of criminality and dangerousness for all Mexican nationals they encounter at the border.130
Although Justice Ginsburg concludes her dissent by noting the
shocking scale of use-of-force abuses committed by those responsible for border enforcement, 131 the majority discounts these
complaints by noting that the action complained of has been addressed “diplomatically” by the other branches of government.132
This, the majority claims, strengthens its opposition to an extension
of Bivens in the Hernández case.
In contrast to the analysis presented by the majority, by seeing the
behavior of Sergio and his companions as childish, albeit unwise,
play (rather than as a bona ﬁde “illegal” border crossing), the dissenters place the onus on the adult law enforcement agent and his
agency to legally justify the fatal conduct.133 They do not see the
case as merely involving the balancing of government necessity
against a “small harm.”134 They and we see the facts leading up to
Sergio’s death as eerily similar to those surrounding the death of
ﬁfteen-year-old Edward Garner, at the hands of Memphis, Tennessee ofﬁcer Elton Hymon, in 1974—except that in Sergio’s case, we
are hard pressed to ﬁnd an underlying felony from which he can
legitimately be said to be ﬂeeing. 135 In the absence of factual
evidence supporting suspicion of such a felony in the Hernández
case, we are equally hard pressed to understand how or why Agent
Mesa ﬁred two shots at the ﬂeeing teen, or how the DOJ found that
the shooting was within CBP policy.136
We also note that our criminal law has long recognized the
diminished capacity of juveniles to reason in ways that produce
punishable conduct by adults. The Common Law recognized a
130

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 746; cf. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d
540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), for additional opinion, see, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y.
2013), stay pending appeal denied, 959 F. Supp. 2d 691 (S.D. N.Y. 2013).
131

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 759–60 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

132

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 745.

133

See Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 756 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

134

See supra note 41 and accompanying text; see also supra note 38–46 and
accompanying text (concerning Justice Hugo Black’s hypothetical used to explain
the prudential constitutional argument).
135

Compare Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1
(1985) (involving the victim’s unlawful ﬂight from the scene of an alleged burglary),
with Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 740 (involving the victim’s playing with friends at the
U.S.-Mexico border).
136

See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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defense of infancy or immaturity to take account of this fact.137 And,
the Court’s own contemporary case law has outlawed capital punishment and mandatory conﬁnement for life without parole for behavior
engaged in before the age of eighteen.138 Immaturity makes juveniles
particularly vulnerable to the “overreaching” behavior by law enforcement that the dissent afﬁrms Bivens claims were designed to remedy
and deter.139 Section 1983 suits cover this action when engaged in
by state or local ofﬁcers. But, as the remainder of this Article makes
clear, our data show that even when fatal encounters take place
between law enforcement and youths who are not at the border
(and, therefore, do not involve political issues attendant to crossborder shootings), parents face results that do not satisfy their sense
of justice.140
V. STUDYING POLICE YOUTH HOMICIDES BEYOND THE BORDER
Between 2013 and 2015, the United States experienced a number
of highly publicized police killings of civilians under circumstances
that led to public protests not seen since the 1960s.141 The death of
137

Under the common law rule, children under age seven were legally incapable
of criminal responsibility; children age seven to fourteen were presumed under the
law to be incapable of criminal responsibility, but the prosecution could present
evidence to rebut that presumption; and children age fourteen and above were
presumed to have the same capacity for criminal responsibility as adults. See, e.g.,
Andrew Walker, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. Rev.
503 (1984).
138

See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407, 78
A.L.R. Fed. 2d 547 (2012) (holding that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause prohibits mandatory sentences of life imprisonment without
parole for those who were younger than eighteen years of age at time of their offenses); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010)
(holding that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
prohibits sentences of life imprisonment without parole for juvenile offenders who
did not commit homicide offenses); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–74, 125
S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005) (holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of individuals who were younger than eighteen years
of age at time of their offenses).
139

See generally DEV. SERV. GROUP, INC., OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, U.S.
DEP’T. JUST., INTERACTIONS BETWEEN YOUTH AND LAW ENFORCEMENT (2018), https://www.ojjd
p.gov/mpg/litreviews/Interactions-Youth-Law-Enforcement.pdf (summarizing the
research on the legal and extralegal factors involved in police interactions with
juveniles).
140

As we explain in Part VI, we note that in ﬁve of the incidents in which children
were killed, the killer was a parent who was a law enforcement ofﬁcer.
141

See, e.g., JENNIFER E. COBBINA, HANDS UP, DON’T SHOOT: WHY THE PROTESTS IN
FERGUSON AND BALTIMORE MATTER, AND HOW THEY CHANGED AMERICA (2019); Erin M. Kerrison, Jennifer E. Cobbina, & Kimberly Bender, “Your Pants Won’t Save You”: Why
Black Youth Challenge Race-Based Police Surveillance and the Demands of Black
Respectability Politics, 8 RACE & JUST. 7 (2018); see also Kwan-Lamar Blount-Hill,
Book Review, Hands Up, Don’t Shoot: Why the Protests in Ferguson and Baltimore
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Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, became the galvanizing
incident that focused attention on the vulnerability of Black male
youth to inadequately explained police violence. 142 The failed
prosecution in this and other cases—especially the killing of Eric
Garner in New York and the killing of Tamir Rice in Cleveland, both
in 2014143—led to calls for abandoning the grand jury system.144
Such cases also energized the Black Lives Matter Movement (BLM),
which was created in the wake of the failed prosecution of George
Zimmerman for fatally shooting Trayvon Martin, an unarmed, Black
seventeen-year-old in a gated community in Sanford, Florida during
2012.145
The protests surrounding the death of Michael Brown at the hands
of White police ofﬁcer Darren Wilson were covered by national and
international media. Additionally, the Ferguson, Missouri, Police
Department’s reaction to the protesters has been largely condemned
Matter, and How They Changed America, CRIM. JUST. REV. (advance online publication Mar. 17, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1177/0734016820912321 (reviewing Jennifer
Cobbina’s book).
142

COBBINA, supra note 141, at 1–3; see also Monica Davey & Julie Bosman,
Protests Flare After Ferguson Police Ofﬁcer Is Not Indicted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/ferguson-darren-wilson-shooting-mich
ael-brown-grand-jury.html; Matt Pearce, Back Story: What Happened in Michael
Brown Shooting in Ferguson, Mo.?, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.latimes.c
om/nation/la-na-back-story-ferguson-shooting-story.html.
143

Jericka Duncan, Eric Garner Case: Video of Chokehold’s Aftermath Raises
New Questions, CBS NEWS (Dec. 6, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/second-ta
pe-of-nypd-chokehold-raises-new-questions-in-eric-garner-case/; Sean Flynn, The
Tamir Rice Story: How to Make a Police Shooting Disappear, GQ.COM (July 14,
2016), https://www.gq.com/story/tamir-rice-story.
144

See J. David Goodman & Al Baker, Wave of Protests After Grand Jury
Doesn’t Indict Ofﬁcer in Eric Garner Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), htt
ps://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/nyregion/grand-jury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in-s
taten-island-chokehold-death-of-eric-garner.html; Melody Gutierrez, Calls Grow to
Eliminate Grand Juries’ Secrecy in Police Killings, SFGATE.COM (Dec. 14, 2014), http
s://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Calls-grow-to-eliminate-grand-juries-secrecy5956945.php; Tierney Sneed, Garner, Brown Decisions Spark Calls for Grand Jury
Reform, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 12, 2014), https://www.usnews.com/news/ar
ticles/2014/12/12/after-eric-garner-michael-brown-decisions-calls-for-grand-jury-ref
orm.
145

See Akiv Dawson, A Space for Countering Colorblind Discourse: Constructions of Police-Perpetrated Homicides of African-American Males, 35 CRITICAL STUD.
IN MEDIA COMM. 300 (2018); see also Delores Jones-Brown & Henry F. Fradella,
From Simpson to Zimmerman: Examining the Effects of Race, Class and Gender in
the Failed Prosecutions of Two Highly Publicized, Racially Divisive Cases, in DEADLY
INJUSTICE: TRAYVON MARTIN, RACE, AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (Devon Johnson,
Patricia Warren & Amy Farrell eds., 2015).
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as militaristic, overly aggressive, and illegitimate. 146 The DOJ
investigation, conducted in the wake of Michael Brown’s death,
exposed a municipal government system that preyed on its poor and
racial and ethnic minority residents through excessive and discriminatory law enforcement, ﬁnes, fees, and conﬁnement.147 The police
killing of Michael Brown, who was eighteen-years-old at the time of
his death, was followed in rapid succession by several other highproﬁle police killings,148 leading some mainstream and social media
sources to declare a police violence epidemic.149
It was against this backdrop that the ﬁrst author of this Article was
hired to teach a course on “Youth, Race, and Justice” at a small
liberal arts college in the South. While preparing to teach the policing portion of the course, speciﬁcally the segment on police use of
force, Google searches continued to turn up the names of young
people who were killed by the police, but for whom there had not
been much media coverage in the area around the college. As a
research project, the six students in the class were assigned to ﬁnd
as many of these incidents as possible occurring in the United States
between January 1, 2013, the calendar year before the death of
Michael Brown, through October 16, 2017, the time of the class. The
upper age limit for victims was set at eighteen. The expectation was
that the students would likely ﬁnd twenty-ﬁve or thirty such incidents
and then spend time studying the cases in-depth. One student found
the data source from which we make the ﬁndings reported here.150
To our surprise, we retrieved 208 names from the internet site
146

COBBINA, supra note 141, at 1–3; see also AMNESTY INT’L, ON THE STREETS OF
AMERICA: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN FERGUSON (2014), https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-co
ntent/uploads/2017/04/onthestreetsofamericaamnestyinternational.pdf.
147

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT REGARDING THE CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION INTO THE SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN BY FERGUSON, MISSOURI POLICE
OFFICER DARREN WILSON (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/opa/
press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/doj_report_on_shooting_of_michael_brow
n_1.pdf.
148

See ALEX S. VITALE, THE END

OF

POLICING 1 (2017).

149

In 2018, New York University hosted a discussion in Washington, D.C., titled,
“The Epidemic of Police Brutality.” The presenters were Jonathan Capehart, a
Pulitzer prize winning journalist and member of the Washington Post editorial
Board, and Andrea Ritchie, a civil rights attorney and researcher in residence at the
Barnard Center for Research on Women. See The Epidemic of Police Brutality,
NYU.EDU. (May 7, 2018), https://www.nyu.edu/washington-dc/nyu-washington—dc-e
vents/the-epidemic-of-police-brutality.html; see also Katie Nodjimbadem, The Long,
Painful History of Police Brutality in the U.S., SMITHSONIAN MAG. (July 27, 2017), http
s://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/long-painful-history-police-brut
ality-in-the-us-180964098/; Maame Banahene, Epidemic of Police Brutality in
America, ARCGIS STORYMAPS (Mar. 18, 2020), https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/6d
201d3be1084eb5838967efe8e4a348.
150

Police Shootings Database - Killed by Police, https://killedbypolice.net/ (last
visited May 15, 2020).

858

© 2020 Thomson Reuters E Criminal Law Bulletin E Vol. 56 No. 5

POLICE LIABILITY FOR YOUTH HOMICIDES
Killedbypolice.net.151 The site did not include the name of Kimani
Gray, a sixteen-year-old killed by police in New York City in March of
2013.152 Our ﬁndings include his information, but exclude the cases
involving eighteen-year-olds because we limit this Article to the 121
victims who were minors, like Sergio Adrian Hernández Güereca.
A. Purpose
The original purpose of the study was to determine the prevalence
of youth homicides perpetrated by police, the characteristics of
victims and ofﬁcers, and the context in which such homicides occur.
Given the number of cases we found, we thought that it was also
important to determine if departments took disciplinary actions
against such ofﬁcers, and if they were subject to criminal or civil law
consequences.
B. Methods
Through internet searches, undergraduate and graduate students
at three universities and co-authors on this paper completed the
labor-intensive task of collecting and coding case-relevant
information. This included demographic factors, such as age, race/
ethnicity, and gender of the victims and the ofﬁcers. We also coded
for a host of contextual variables, many of which we report here. In
total, we coded thirty-nine variables, but note that following the
shooting of police ofﬁcers in Dallas and New York,153 information
about police ofﬁcers involved in the cases we studied—including
151

Killedbypolice.net is a privately run website that collects and provides
information about ofﬁcer-involved deaths in conjunction with mappingpoliceviolence.org. Because we were able to ﬁnd information on each of the cases listed on the
website during the time period of interest, we are conﬁdent that the site does not
overcount the number of underage persons killed by the policed during the period
of interest. However, since the site appears to have a method for mining other
public and ofﬁcial sources for information regarding ofﬁcer-involved killings, and
cases involving juveniles are subject to non-disclosure rules, it is possible that the
site undercounts cases with juvenile victims, such as we discovered with Kamani
Gray.
152

In addition to the omission of the name of Kimani Gray, we note that for two
incidents, the names of the victims are listed as “anonymous” but the year they
were killed, their age and the state in which they were killed is reported. The fetus
carried by 16-year-old Elena Mondragon is not coded as a separate victim. See
Sam T. Levin, Police Shot a Pregnant California Teen—But With No Video, the
Case Dried Up, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-new
s/2018/mar/15/elena-mondragon-police-shooting-california-no-video.
153

See, Ron Jenkins, 5 Police Ofﬁcers Killed in Dallas Shooting, 21 CBS (DallasFt. Worth local afﬁliate, July 7, 2016), https://dfw.cbslocal.com/photo-galleries/2016/
07/08/ﬁve-police-ofﬁcers-killed-in-dallas-shooting/ (online slideshow); Female NYPD
Ofﬁcer Ambushed and Shot Dead in the Bronx as She Finished Shift, TELEGRAPH
(July 5, 2017), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/05/new-york-city-police-off
icer-ambushed-shot-dead-patrol/ (describing the shooting death of two additional ofﬁcers in 2014).
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their names—became much more difﬁcult to ﬁnd. 154 In many
instances, such information was not revealed at all. Although such
measures were ostensibly taken in the name of ofﬁcer privacy and
safety, the nondisclosure has resulted in a great deal of missing
data for many of the cases we analyzed. Despite this limitation, we
ﬁnd the data quite telling.
VI. FINDINGS
As previously mentioned, we examined the details of 118 incidents
nationwide involving 121 victims under the age of eighteen that occurred between January 1, 2013 and October 16, 2017.
A. The Number of Incidents
We were disturbed to see that, despite the prolonged protests in
Ferguson and other places, and the multi-city DOJ investigations
and consent decrees, the number of victims did not decrease in the
years following the 2014 death of Michael Brown (see Table 1). In
fact, twelve more victims were killed in the ﬁrst three quarters of
2017 than in all of 2014 (see Table 1). Of the thirty-four reported
victims in 2017,through October 16th, ten were coded as Hispanic/
Latinx—nearly a third (see Table 2).
Table 1: Number of Incidents by Year155
Year of Incident
Number of Victims
2013
19
2014
22
2015
24
2016
22
2017
34
Total:
121

154

See Katie Blackly & Megan Harris, Bill Would Withhold Police Ofﬁcers’
Names after Shooting or Use of Force, 90.5 WESA (Pittsburgh NPR, Mar. 22,
2017), https://www.wesa.fm/post/bill-would-withhold-police-ofﬁcers-names-after-sho
oting-or-use-force#stream/0.
155

The 2017 data includes all incidents from that year up until October 16,
2017, the date on which data collection ended for this study.
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Table 2: Number of Hispanic/Latinx Victims by Year156
Year of Incident
Number of Victims
2013
5
2014
9
2015
4
2016
3
2017
10
Total:
31

B. The Victims
Mirroring police killings of adults,157 our data reveal that the juvenile
victims were disproportionately youth of color; in fact, as Table 3
reveals, youth of color account for 65.3% of the total number of child
victims, compared to 30.6% who were White. Consistent with
statistics for incidents involving adults killed by police,158 a substantial
majority of these underage victims were male (n = 104, 85.9%), one
of whom presented as openly gay. There were ﬁfteen victims who
were female (12.4%) and the sex of one victim is unknown.
As Table 4 illustrates, and as might be expected, the overwhelming majority of victims were adolescents between the ages thirteen
to seventeen (n = 101), but victims also included children ages four
to twelve (n = 13), as well as toddlers and infants (n = 6).
Table 3: Racial and Ethnic Identities of Victims
Race
Number of Victims
White
37
Black or African American
43
Hispanic/Latinx
31
Asian or Paciﬁc Islander
2
Native American
2
Other
1
Missing/Unknown
5
Total:
121

Percent
30.58
35.54
25.62
1.65
1.65
0.83
4.1
100.0

156

As with Table 1, the 2017 data in Table 2 includes all incidents from that year
up until October 16, 2017, the date on which data collection ended for this study.
157

Jones-Brown & Blount-Hill, supra note 30, at 295.

158

Jones-Brown & Blount-Hill, supra note 30, at 296.
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Table 4: Age of Victims
Age Range
Number of Victims
Less than 1 Year (Infant)
4
1 to 3 Years (Toddler)
2
4 to 6 years (Young Child)
3
7 to 12 years (Child)
10
13 to 17 years (Adolescent)
101
Missing/Unknown
1
Total:
121

Percent
3.31
1.65
2.48
8.26
83.47
0.83
100.0

C. The Ofﬁcers
There are so much missing ofﬁcer data that it is impossible to
deﬁnitively identify a speciﬁc demographic proﬁle. This issue is
compounded by the fact that some incidents involved one ofﬁcer
while others involved multiple ofﬁcers, some of whom were of different racial and ethnic identities. Of the ﬁfty-nine cases for which the
race or ethnicity of at least one ofﬁcer is known, forty-two (71.2%)
were White (see Table 5). Table 6 presents ofﬁcer ages for the thirtynine cases in which the age of at least one ofﬁcer is known.
Table 5: Known Racial and Ethnic Identities of Ofﬁcers
Race
Number of Ofﬁcers
White
42
Black or African American
5
Hispanic/Latinx
8
Asian or Paciﬁc Islander
2
Native American
1
Other
1
Total:
59

Race
18 to 25
26 to 30
31 to 35
36 to 40
41 to 45
45 or Older

Table 6: Known Ages of Ofﬁcers
Number of Ofﬁcers
3
13
6
6
4
7
Total:
39

Percent
71.19
8.48
13.56
3.39
1.70
1.70
100.0

Percent
7.69
33.33
15.39
15.39
10.26
17.95
100.0

We were able to determine the sex of at least one ofﬁcer in ninety
four of the cases. Of those, ninety-one ofﬁcers (96.8%) were male
and three (3.2%) were female. Their agency types are presented in
Table 7.
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Table 7: Agency Types for Ofﬁcers
Race
Number
Federal
2
State
12
County/Local/Municipal
98
Missing/Unknown
9
Total:
121

Percent
1.65
9.92
80.99
7.44
100.0

D. Incident Settings
Tables 8 and 9 provide information about the spatial distribution of
these youth homicide cases. Not surprisingly, the greatest number
(n = 55) occurred in urban settings, but as Table 8 shows, suburban
and rural settings were not immune from such incidents.
Race
Urban
Suburban
Rural
Missing/Unknown

Table 8: Community Setting
Number
55
29
14
23
Total:
121

Percent
45.45
23.97
11.57
19.01
100.0

Table 9 presents the states in which each victim was killed. Most
of the killings occurred in the South (n = 51, 42.15%), followed, in
descending frequency, by the West (n = 31, 25.62%), the Midwest (n
= 27, 22.31%), and the Northeast (n = 12, 9.92%). Three states—
California, Illinois,159 and Texas—accounted for nearly forty percent
of the cases.
159

This includes locations outside of the City of Chicago.
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Table 9: States Where Killings Occurred
State
Number of Killings
Alabama
4
Alaska
1
Arizona
3
Arkansas
1
California
19
Colorado
3
Connecticut
1
Florida
8
Georgia
4
Illinois
15
Indiana
3
Kansas
1
Kentucky
1
Louisiana
5
Maryland
1
Michigan
4
Mississippi
1
Missouri
3
New Jersey
3
New Mexico
2
New York
5
North Carolina
6
Ohio
2
Pennsylvania
2
Tennessee
3
Texas
14
Utah
2
Virginia
2
Washington
1
Wisconsin
1
Total:
121

Percent
3.31
0.83
2.48
0.83
15.70
2.48
0.83
6.61
3.31
12.40
2.48
0.83
0.83
4.13
0.83
3.31
0.83
2.48
2.48
1.65
4.13
4.96
1.65
1.65
2.48
11.57
1.65
1.65
0.83
0.83
100.0

In more than half of the cases (n = 69, 57.0%), the young victim
was armed with a gun or knife, mostly guns.160 But in forty-eight
cases (39.7%), the victim was unarmed. Whether the victims in the
remaining four deaths were armed could not be determined (n =
3.30%). In ten of the sixty-nine cases (14.4%) in which the victim
was reported to be armed, the facts suggest that the victim was hav160

This says something tragic about gun availability in the United States. For
discussions about how easy it is for minors to obtain ﬁrearms, see Tessa Duvall,
Where Do Children Get Guns? Inmates Reveal How Easy It Is, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Sept. 22, 3018), https://apnews.com/3011b3d3ba014d21a66c1b6eea48120d/Wher
e-do-children-get-g.
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ing a mental health crisis; in fact, nine of these cases are suspected
episodes of “suicide by cop.”161
As with their adult counterparts,162 the overwhelming majority (n =
96, 79.3%) of youth victims were shot. But twenty-four (19.8%) were
killed by other means, most frequently by having been struck by a
vehicle operated by an ofﬁcer. The method of killing could not be
determined for only one case. Notably, though, the data include both
on-duty and off-duty police behavior. Consequently, there were
domestic situations in which police ofﬁcers who were parents harmed
their own children. Speciﬁcally, in two incidents, children died from
being left in hot cars. In another incident, two children were killed in
a murder-suicide. And one additional case concerned a reported accidental shooting involving a police ofﬁcer and his teenage son.
E. Case Outcomes
It bears repeating once more that law enforcement behavior is a
highly political governmental function about which opinion polls and
other social scientiﬁc data document there is little public
consensus.163 With that in mind, we report the outcomes in the youth
homicide cases in the aggregate, without attempting to make an
independent assessment as to whether those results are legally
appropriate. We highlight a few cases that raise questions of equity
and accountability to emphasize the salience of these issues beyond
law enforcement activity at the border.164
If, as we will discuss in the ﬁnal section of this Article, the justice
system in the United States is more committed to protecting than
punishing children and adolescent 165 because as a society we
recognize their unique vulnerability on account of their immaturity,
one might expect that cases involving the death of minors would
receive a high level of scrutiny. In fact, they do when the suspected
161

“Suicide by cop” refers to situations in which a suicidal individual deliberately
behaves in a threatening manner with the intent to provoke a lethal response from
the police. See REBECCA A. STINCELLI, SUICIDE BY POLICE: VICTIMS FROM BOTH SIDES OF THE
BADGE (2004).
162

See Jones-Brown & Blount-Hill, supra note 30, at 271 n.1.

163

Ekins, supra note 95, at 1 (explaining “stark racial and partisan divides in
favorability toward police”).
164

Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to provide detailed accounts of
each of the cases in the dataset, we want to acknowledge the limitations of relying
on publicly available data from ofﬁcial and private sites. Nonetheless, we contend
that having some collective knowledge of these incidents puts us all in a better
position than having none.
165

See, e.g., RIOS, HUMAN TARGETS, supra note 3, at 14, 155–66 (discussing the
distinction between a juvenile justice system focused on care versus one focused
on control); Marvin Ventrell, The Practice of Law for Children, 66 MONT. L. REV. 1, 11
(2005) (explaining how the child savers movement focused the justice system on
caring for children, rather than just “keeping the streets free” of them).
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perpetrators are civilian parents, guardians, or members of the
general public. 166 The dissent in Hernández v. Mesa seems
concerned that the majority’s decision will exempt the behavior of
federal law enforcement agents from the kind of scrutiny that a nation dedicated to the protection of children must exercise or allow to
be exercised.
We were able to learn the outcome of departmental disciplinary
proceedings for eighty-one (66.9%) of the 121 incidents in our
dataset. Those outcomes are presented in Table 10. Note that in
ﬁfty-six of the eight-one cases (69.1%) in which disciplinary
outcomes are known no disciplinary action was taken against the ofﬁcer(s) who killed an underage person.
Table 10: Final Departmental/Agency Actions Against Ofﬁcers
Action
Number
Percent
No Disciplinary Action
56
46.28
Termination
13
10.74
Reprimand
4
3.31
Suspension
3
2.48
Resignation
2
1.65
Transfer
1
0.83
Other Disciplinary
1
0.83
Counseling or Retaining
1
0.83
Unknown/Missing
40
33.06
100.0
Total:
121

Similarly, as Table 11 illustrates, in sixty-nine of the ninety-three
(74.1%) cases for which we were able to obtain information, the ofﬁcer(s) were not charged criminally for causing the minor’s death. In
the seven cases (7.5%) that resulted in a criminal conviction either
by plea or verdict, two resulted in sentences of probation and ﬁve
resulted in a sentence of a period of conﬁnement. One of those ﬁve
custodial sentences involved a six-month jail sentence, followed by
probation for up to ﬁve years; the other four resulted in prison
sentences.
166

Consider laws requiring sex offenders to continuously register with law
enforcement agencies once convicted (also known as Megan’s Laws, named after
a seven-year-old rape and murder victim in New Jersey in 1994). Under some
circumstances, these laws allow information about registrants to be released to the
public. Relevant to child protection, the laws impose restrictions that prohibit certain
classes of sex offenders from having contact with children. See generally Jill S.
Levinson, David A. D’Amora, & Andrea L. Hern, Megan’s Law and its Impact on
Community Re-Entry for Sex Offenders, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 587 (2007) (explaining
the purposes and consequences of sex-offender notiﬁcation laws).
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Table 11: Criminal Law Outcomes Against Ofﬁcers
Action
Number
No Charges Filed
69
No Bill (Not Indicted)
9
True Bill (Indicted)
5
Not Guilty Verdict
3
Guilty Plea or No Contest Plea
2
Guilty Verdict/Convicted
5
Unknown/Missing
28
Total:
121

Percent
57.02
7.44
4.13
2.48
1.65
4.13
23.14
100.0

Finally, we were unable to learn whether surviving family members
ﬁled civil lawsuits in forty-two (34.7%) of the incidents. Of the
seventy-nine incidents in which we were able to learn if subsequent
civil actions had been ﬁled, forty-six families (58.2%) had done so,
whereas thirty-four families (44.1%) did not. Table 12 presents the
outcomes of the forty-six cases in which lawsuits were ﬁled. Note
that in ten cases, we were unable to conﬁrm the status of the
lawsuits.
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Table 12: Civil Lawsuit Outcomes Against Ofﬁcers
Action
Number
Settlement
17
Finding of No Liability
3
Finding of Liability
2
Lawsuit Still Pending
14
Status Unknown
10
Total:
46

Percent

In our view, and we believe in the view of the dissent, the
Hernández case raises concerns about the level of care we expect
law enforcement agents to show toward the young. By opening the
juvenile court system in 1899, we contend that the United States
signaled an acceptance of the responsibility for treating children with
care.167 Within the dataset, we found two cases in which ofﬁcers who
had been speeding killed three teenage girls and were not held
criminally liable.168 In another motor vehicle case, an ofﬁcer was using his agency vehicle to transport his children when he crashed into
a civilian car killing nine-month-old Raiden Saechao. Despite his
distracted driving, the ofﬁcer was not criminally charged.169 Two different ofﬁcers left their children (one a four-month-old boy, the other
a three-year-old girl) in hot cars alone for hours; each child died, but
only the female ofﬁcer was charged with criminal homicide.170 These
167

RIOS, HUMAN TARGETS, supra note 3, at 14, 155–66 (discussing the distinction
between a juvenile justice system focused on care versus one focused on control).
168

In the case of Isabella Chinchilla and Kylie Lindsey, the ofﬁcer was found to
have been traveling at ninety-one miles-per-hour in a ﬁfty-miles-per-hour zone even
though the ofﬁcer was not on a service call. See Alexis Stevens, Ex-trooper Avoids
Charges in Fatal Crash, Families of Teens Angry, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Mar. 18, 2016),
https://www.ajc.com/news/local/trooper-avoids-charges-fatal-crash-families-teens-an
gry/xdvYXTdpR3IQ5YOHuAbq2M/. In the case of fourteen-year-old Terry Difalco,
she was struck and killed by an automobile driven by an off-duty state police
trooper who was texting while driving; the trooper was not criminally charged. See
Rebecca Panico, Off-Duty Trooper was Texting Before Striking and Killing N.J. Teen
in Westﬁeld, Lawsuit Alleges, NJ.COM (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.nj.com/union/
2019/11/off-duty-trooper-who-struck-killed-14-year-old-accused-in-lawsuit-of-textingjust-before-crash.html.
169

Nashelly Chavez, Sacramento Will Pay $9.75 Million to Parents of Baby
Killed When Police Ofﬁcer Crashed into Their Car, SACRAMENTO BEE (July 18, 2017),
https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/article162121623.html.
170

Mark Fanfarillo, a police ofﬁcer in Rome, New York, was not charged in the
death of his son Michael. See Tiffany Head, No Charges for Police Ofﬁcer Whose
Baby Died After Being Left in Car, WJLA.COM (July 26 2016), https://wjla.com/news/
nation-world/no-charges-for-police-ofﬁcer-whose-baby-died-after-being-left-in-car;
By contrast, Cassie Clark, a former Long Beach, Mississippi police ofﬁcer, was
convicted of second degree manslaughter for the death of her daughter, Cheyenne
Heyer, in April of 2019 and sentenced to twenty years in prison. She had previously
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cases suggest a police accountability problem that extends beyond
the border.
VII. A CALL TO (RE)PRIORITIZE CHILD SAVING
Justice Ginsburg concludes her dissent in Hernández v. Mesa by
noting the shocking scale of verbal, physical, and even sexual abuse
taking place in the course of border enforcement,171 with eerie
similarity to Justice Sotomayor’s forceful dissent in Utah v. Strieff172
in which she decried domestic abuses of law enforcement powers.
The ﬁnal component of Bobbitt’s typology for understanding
Supreme Court decisions is what he calls the ethical argument. He
spends nearly one hundred pages explaining and applying it. 173
Though some might conclude that the dissent’s analysis in Hernández turns on their consideration of the precedents set in Garner and
Bivens, there is a subtext that implies ethical argument. Bobbitt
notes that the patches of opinion that invoke ethical argument
contain “expressions of considerable passion and conviction.”174
Indeed, such passages appear throughout the dissenting opinion
and culminate with Justice Ginsburg quoting from the amicus brief
submitted by former Customs and Border Protections ofﬁcials:
[T]he United States has not extradited a Border Patrol agent to stand
trial in Mexico, and to [the amici’s] knowledge has itself prosecuted
only one agent in a cross-border shooting . . . [W]ithout the possibility
of civil liability, the unlikely prospect of discipline or criminal prosecution will not provide a meaningful deterrent to abuse at the border.175

She closes her dissent by saying, “[i]n short, it is all too apparent
that to redress injuries like the one suffered here, it is Bivens or
nothing. I resist the conclusion that ‘nothing’ is the answer in this
case.”176
We believe that, unlike the majority, Justice Ginsburg and her fellow dissenters were deeply shaken by the considerable evidence of
violent harm occurring at the border; the fact that it was being
perpetrated by U.S. government agents; and that, in the instant
case, the violence was perpetrated against a child. They did not
been involved in another incident in which she left Cheyenne in a car. Former Long
Beach Police Ofﬁcer Gets 20 Years in Prison for the Hot-Car Death of Her ThreeYear Old Child, SEA COAST ECHO (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.seacoastecho.com/new
s/former-long-beach-police-ofﬁcer-gets-20-years-in-prison-for-the-hot-car-death/artic
le_c3f14ea0-54c6-11e9-afda-e3b2f2246ddd.html
171

Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 759–60, 206 L. Ed. 2d 29 (2020).

172

Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2068–71, 195 L. Ed. 2d 400 (2016)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
173

BOBBITT, supra note 21, at 93–167.

174

BOBBITT, supra note 21, at 94.

175

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 760 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

176

Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 760 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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want such behavior to be an accepted or acceptable part of the
American ethos—its character or its institutions.177 As we understand
Bobbitt’s ethical perspective, it is clear that the dissenters did not
believe that the majority’s decision “comports with the sort of people
we [Americans] are . . .” or want to be.178 Agent Mesa’s and the
Justices in the Hernández majority’s characterization of youthful play
as criminal is an example of why the child saving movement was
developed in the nineteenth century.179
The “child savers” were a group of reformers who sought to protect
children from physical and moral harm, particularly those considered
wayward, delinquent, or criminal.180 As mentioned previously, it was
believed that youth were less responsible for their actions, and more
susceptible to positive change through rehabilitation than were
adults.181 The child savers championed reforms and advocated for a
wide range of policies such as child labor laws, mandatory schooling, early childhood education and recreation, and a separation of
adolescent offenders from adults, which led to the creation of the
juvenile justice system.182
The purpose of the child saving movement was to establish protections for children and support their development as productive
members of society.183 The majority opinion in Hernández suggests
that such protections are only available to children inside the United
States. They seem comfortable with the notion that agents of the
U.S. government can end the life of an unarmed juvenile, so long as
it is done in the name of national security. But, as Justice Ginsburg
notes, prior case law warns against this broad adoption of national
security claims.184 And our data show that we may already be losing
177

BOBBITT, supra note 21, at 94.

178

BOBBITT, supra note 21, at 95.

179

Roger J. R. Levesque, Child Savers, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ADOLESCENCE (Roger J.
R. Levesque ed., Springerlink living ed. 2016), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-31932132-5_669-2; Ventrell, supra note 165, at 11 (“The result of the child savers’ efforts and the development of the juvenile court was that children became a
recognized . . . class . . . worthy of society’s service . . . a kind of benevolent
caregiving.”).
180

Melissa M. Moon, Jody L. Sundt, Francis T. Cullen, & John Paul Wright, Is
Child Saving Dead? Public Support for Juvenile Rehabilitation, 46 CRIME & DELINQ.
38 (2000).
181

Moon et al., supra note 180, at 39.

182

Moon et al., supra note 180, at 38.

183

Levesque, supra note 179; Ventrell, supra note 165, at 11–12.

184

Hernández v. Mesa, 136 S. Ct. 735, 758 (2020) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“Abbasi cautioned against invocations of national security of this very order:
“[N]ational-security concerns must not become a talisman used to ward off
inconvenient claims—a ‘label’ used to ‘cover a multitude of sins.’ ’’) (citing Ziglar v.
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ground on protecting youth from law enforcement harm inside the
border.
The child savers believed that government intervention should
provide treatment and rehabilitation for young offenders, not strip
them of constitutional rights and even life itself, with impunity.185 The
advent of crimmigration has meant that Latinx youth who are not
closely supervised at the U.S./Mexico border run the risk of their
leisure time activities being perceived as dangerous conduct requiring the application of fatal social control. Critics of the child saving
movement pointed to differential rates of incarceration by class,
race, gender, and immigrant status as an indicator that the rehabilitative goal needed to be applied more equitably.186 If a civil remedy is
not available to address constitutional violations for youth at the
border, they are in danger of contributing more signiﬁcantly to the
number of youth who die at the hands of sworn law enforcers. Our
data suggest that number is already too high.
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1862, 198 L. Ed. 2d 290 (2017) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 523, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411, 2 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 221
(1985))).
185

Randie P. Ullman, Federal Juvenile Waiver Practices: A Contextual Approach
to the Consideration of Prior Delinquency Records, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1329 (2000).
186

Meda Chesney-Lind, Challenging Girls’ Invisibility in Juvenile Court, 564
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 185 (1999); Roger R. J. Levesque, The Failures of
Foster Care Reform: Revolutionizing the Most Radical Blueprint, 6 MD. J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1995); Patrick J. Morrisette, The Holocaust of First Nation People:
Residual Effects on Parenting and Treatment Implications, 16 CONTEMP. FAM. THERAPY
381 (1994).
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